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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
Six Delaware statutory trusts (the “Trusts”) acquired 
student loans, issued notes for those acquisitions, and pledged 
the student loans as collateral for the notes.  This process, 
called a securitization, works well when the students do not 
default on their loans.  When they do, a servicer of the loans 
attempts to collect.  If that servicer comes up short, there is a 
problem.  That is what occurred here.  To remedy the problem 
and aid collection, an additional servicer was added by the 
owners of the Trusts.  May this be done under the documents 
for the securitization and, if so, were the requirements in those 
documents followed?  To flesh out this dispute, what follows 
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is a Reader’s Digest version followed by a more complete 
factual and procedural background.   
Each Trust stems from a trust agreement (the “Trust 
Agreement”) pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act.  
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3801(g).  The Trusts issued notes (the 
“Notes”) entitling their holders (the “Noteholders”) to the 
income from the student loans purchased with Note proceeds.  
To secure the Notes, the Trusts pledged the student loans under 
a “Granting Clause” in documents called “Indentures” entered 
into with U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”), as 
Indenture Trustee.  
The Indentures also contain various protections for the 
benefit of the Indenture Trustee and the Noteholders, including 
a requirement that the Trusts obtain consent from the Indenture 
Trustee and the Noteholders to amend, supplement, or 
terminate the Indentures (the “Consent Clause”).   
The Trusts initially did not provide for servicing loans 
delinquent in their payments.  They later entered into a 
“Special Servicing Agreement” to do so.  U.S. Bank became 
both the Indenture Trustee and the “Special Servicer” under the 
Special Servicing Agreement.  It is here our dispute begins.   
U.S. Bank allegedly failed as the Special Servicer to 
collect hundreds of millions of dollars in delinquent loans.  To 
mitigate losses, holders of the equity ownership interests in the 
Trusts (the “Owners”) sought to hire an additional loan 
servicer, and ultimately entered into an agreement for Odyssey 
Education Resources, LLC (“Odyssey”) to serve in that role 
(the “Odyssey Agreement”).  Thereafter the Trusts submitted 
invoices from Odyssey for payment from the trust estate. 
The parties dispute whether the Trusts had the right to 
enter the Odyssey Agreement and whether that Agreement 
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conflicts with the “Basic Documents,” meaning the Indentures, 
the Trust Agreements, along with the Servicing Agreements, 
and other related agreements.  On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court held that: (1) the Trusts did not 
violate the Granting Clause by hiring Odyssey and retaining 
the right to hire a new servicer; (2) the Trusts were not required 
to obtain consent to hire Odyssey because the Odyssey 
Agreement did not waive, amend, modify, supplement, or 
terminate any of the terms of the Basic Documents; (3) 
Odyssey’s invoices were accordingly payable; and (4) the 
question whether the Odyssey Agreement was the result of 
improper self-dealing was irrelevant.  U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr. 2003-1, No. 16-cv-341, 2018 
WL 4462369 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2018).   
We affirm in part and reverse in part.  We agree that the 
Granting Clause does not bar the Trusts from appointing an 
additional servicer, yet we also hold that several provisions of 
the Odyssey Agreement violate the Granting Clause by 
impermissibly transferring to the Owners of the Trusts rights 
reserved for the Indenture Trustee.  We also part with the 
District Court and hold that the Odyssey Agreement 
supplements and modifies several provisions of the Basic 
Documents, thus requiring consents not obtained from the 
Indenture Trustee.  Accordingly, the Odyssey Agreement is 
invalid, and we remand to the District Court to determine 
whether the Odyssey invoices are nonetheless payable (which 
may include a re-look at the self-dealing issue).   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Creation, Structure, and Basic 
Documents of the Trusts 
The Trusts (National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts 
2003-1, 2004-1, 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2, and 2005-3) were 
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created between 2003 and 2005.  Their purpose was to acquire 
student loans by issuing notes and executing indentures, to 
provide for administration of the Trusts and servicing of the 
student loans, and to enter into other necessary agreements to 
achieve the foregoing.  Trust Agreement (“TA”) § 2.03(a), J.A. 
267–68.  
The Trust Agreements appointed an owner trustee (the 
“Owner Trustee”) to act for and manage the affairs of each 
Trust.  The Owner Trustee in turn appointed an administrator 
(the “Administrator”) to aid it in discharging its duties and to 
take certain actions under an administration agreement (the 
“Administration Agreement”).  GSS Data Services Inc. 
(“GSS”) initially served as Administrator.  J.A. 148–49.   
To fund the acquisition of the student loans, the Trusts 
issued Notes to the Noteholders.  The Notes are backed by the 
loans and are paid through principal and interest payments 
received from the student loan borrowers. 
Appellants are the Noteholders,1 and U.S. Bank, which 
serves as the current Indenture Trustee for the Trusts (together 
“Appellants”).  The Indentures are governed by New York law.  
See Indenture § 11.13, J.A. 384. 
The Administration Agreements were entered into on 
various dates by and among each of the Trusts, Wilmington 
Trust Company (“Wilmington Trust”) as Owner Trustee, U.S. 
Bank as Indenture Trustee, The National Collegiate Funding 
 
1 The interested Noteholders (participating in this suit) 
are Waterfall Asset Management, LLC, One William Street 
Capital Master Fund, Ltd., OWS Credit Opportunity I, LLC, 
OWS ABS Fund II, L.P., and OWS COF I Master, L.P.  The 
Noteholders and U.S. Bank initially brought separate appeals 
that are herein consolidated. 
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LLC as the Depositor, and First Marblehead Data Services, 
Inc. (“First Marblehead Data”) as Administrator under each 
Administration Agreement. 
Under the Indentures, the Trusts granted all of the right, 
title, and interest in and to, among other things, the student 
loans held by the Trusts, the related agreements, funds and 
accounts, and all related present and future claims related 
thereto (collectively, the “Indenture Trust Estate”) to the 
Indenture Trustee for the benefit of the Noteholders.   
The Granting Clause, under which the Trusts grant their 
interest in the student loans to the Indenture Trustee, provides 
in relevant part: 
The Issuer [i.e., the Trust] hereby Grants2 to the 
Indenture Trustee at the Closing Date with 
 
2 The Indenture defines “Grant” in a litany of legal 
jargon meant to be very broad: 
 
“Grant” means mortgage, pledge, bargain, sell, 
warrant, alienate, remise, release, convey, 
assign, transfer, create, and grant a lien upon and 
a security interest in and right of setoff against, 
deposit, set over and confirm pursuant to the 
Indenture.  A Grant of the Collateral or of any 
other agreement or instrument shall include all 
rights, powers and options (but none of the 
obligations) of the Granting party thereunder, 
including the immediate and continuing right to 
claim for, collect, receive and give receipt for 
principal and interest payments in respect of the 
Collateral and all other moneys payable 
thereunder, to give and receive notices and other 
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respect to the Initial Financed Student Loans, 
and as of each Subsequent Transfer Date with 
respect to Subsequent Loans acquired as of such 
date, as trustee for the benefit of the holders of 
the Notes, all the Issuer’s right, title and interest 
in and to the following: 
(a) the Student Loans, and all obligations of the 
Obligors thereunder including all moneys paid 
thereunder on or after the Cutoff Date . . . ; 
(b) all Servicing Agreements and all Student 
Loan Purchase Agreements, including the right 
of the Issuer to cause the Sellers to repurchase[,] 
or the Servicer to purchase, Student Loans from 
the Issuer under circumstances described therein; 
. . . . 
Indenture at 1–2, J.A. 317–18.  It is “absolute.”  Indenture 
§ 3.07(f), J.A. 336.  
To protect the Noteholders’ interests, the Indentures 
include “Issuer Separateness Covenants” that impose on the 
Trusts obligations to “maintain an arm’s length relationship 
with . . . any of the [Trusts’] Affiliates.”  Indenture § 3.23(l), 
 
communications, to make waivers or other 
agreements, to exercise all rights and options, to 
bring Proceedings in the name of the Granting 
party or otherwise and generally to do and 
receive anything that the Granting party is or 
may be entitled to do or receive thereunder or 
with respect thereto. 
 
Indenture, App. A-16, J.A. 406.  
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J.A. 346.  So long as the Notes are outstanding, the Trusts must 
“avoid the appearance [] of conducting business on behalf of 
any Owner or any Affiliate of an Owner.”  TA § 2.03(b)(iv), 
J.A. 268.  In addition, the Indentures require the consent of 
Noteholders and the Indenture Trustee in order to “waive, 
amend, modify, supplement or terminate” any of the Basic 
Documents.  Indenture §§ 3.07(c), (f), J.A. 336–37. 
B. Special Loan Servicing Agreements 
At the Trusts’ inception, the Pennsylvania Higher 
Education Assistance Agency (“PA Education Agency”) acted 
as the sole Servicer for each Trust pursuant to a servicing 
agreement (the “PA Education Agency Servicing 
Agreement”).  Under it, the PA Education Agency serviced 
performing, or up-to-date, student loans and could purchase 
those loans out of the Trusts but only for “an amount equal to 
the principal balance and accrued and unpaid interest.”  J.A. 
605, 740. 
The Basic Documents at the outset did not provide for 
servicing loans delinquent in their payments because The 
Educational Resources Institute Inc. (the “Resource Institute”) 
guaranteed full repayment on those loans.  After that entity’s 
bankruptcy in 2008, however, the Trusts established a regime 
for servicing delinquent student loans.  Specifically, in 2009 
the Trusts entered into a “Special Servicing Agreement” for the 
purpose of servicing two categories of non-performing student 
loans, “Defaulted Loans” and “Delinquent Loans.”  J.A. 428.   
The Special Servicing Agreement was entered into by 
and among First Marblehead Education Resources, Inc. (“First 
Marblehead Education”) and each of the Trusts, which named 
First Marblehead Education as Special Servicer for delinquent 
and defaulted loans (hereinafter referred to as “Defaulted 
Loans”).  The Special Servicing Agreement provided that U.S. 
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Bank was the “Back-up Special Servicer,” and that if First 
Marblehead Education were to resign as Special Servicer, U.S. 
Bank would replace it.  J.A. 428. 
The Special Servicing Agreement further provided that 
Defaulted Loans are serviced exclusively by the Special 
Servicer.  Amendments to the Special Servicing Agreement 
had to be agreed to by parties other than the Trust, including 
the Special Servicer, and U.S. Bank (as Indenture Trustee) and 
the Administrator.  Special Servicing Agreement (“SSA”) 
§ 16, J.A. 442.  For the Trusts to replace the Special Servicer, 
they were required to provide prior written notice to the rating 
agencies Moody’s Corp., S&P Global Ratings, and Fitch 
Ratings Inc., (collectively, the “Rating Agencies”), and receive 
written confirmation that the proposed successor would not 
result in a reduction or withdrawal of the Notes’ then-current 
ratings (the “Special Servicing Agreement Rating Agency 
Condition”).  SSA § 6(E), J.A. 433; see also Indenture, 
Definitions, J.A. 414 (instructing that “each Rating Agency 
shall have been given 10 days’ prior notice thereof . . . [,] and 
that none of the Rating Agencies shall have notified the 
Administrator or the Indenture Trustee[] in writing that such 
action will in and of itself result in a reduction or withdrawal 
of the then current rating of the Notes . . . .” (the “Indenture 
Rating Agency Condition”)).  
In 2012, First Marblehead Data was sold, and shortly 
thereafter First Marblehead Education resigned as Special 
Servicer.  U.S. Bank then became Special Servicer.   
C. The Trusts Hire Odyssey  
The Trusts allege that since U.S. Bank took over as 
Special Servicer over $1 billion of loans have become 
uncollectable due to the expiration of the relevant statute of 
limitations and over $4 billion of loans have defaulted.  The 
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Trusts are paying servicing fees in excess of any revenues they 
can collect on the Defaulted Loans.   
In addition, lawsuits filed by U.S. Bank on behalf of the 
Trusts against borrowers for collection on Defaulted Loans 
were dismissed due to faulty documentation and procedures, 
and subsequently the Trusts were sued in both class action suits 
and by individuals for illegal collection practices.   
To mitigate losses, the Owners sought to hire an 
additional loan servicer.  In 2014 they entered an agreement for 
Odyssey to act as a Servicer for each Trust’s Loans.  Odyssey 
Agreement (“OA”), J.A. 490–500.   
At inception the Owners of the Trusts were the National 
Collegiate Funding LLC, a depositor and sponsor of the 
securitizations, and the Resource Institute.  In 2014, at the time 
of the Odyssey transaction, the beneficial owners of the Trusts 
were an affiliate of Citibank named SL Resid Holdings, LLC 
(“Citibank”) and an affiliate of VCG Securities, LLC (“VCG”) 
named NC Owners, LLC.  VCG was the authorized 
representative of the Owners in connection with the Odyssey 
transaction.  At the time of the Odyssey Agreement, Odyssey 
had two members, VCG and Boston Portfolio Advisors, Inc.  
The latter resigned in 2017, leaving VCG as the sole member 
of Odyssey.3   
 
3 Appellants point out that VCG is now the majority 
equity owner of the Trusts and the only owner of Odyssey.  
This arguably leaves one entity doing the pooling and the 
servicing of the student loans.   
 
The Trusts counter that U.S. Bank is the party with a 
“substantial conflict[] of interest” here “given its dual roles as 
Indenture Trustee and Special Servicer . . . .”  Appellees’ Br. 
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When the Owners decided to hire an additional loan 
servicer, they sent letters to the Rating Agencies informing 
them about the Odyssey Agreement.  None of the agencies 
expressed that hiring Odyssey would cause a downgrade.  
After more than 10 days had passed from the time the Rating 
Agencies were notified of the Trusts’ intention to hire 
Odyssey, the Owners directed Wilmington Trust to execute the 
Odyssey Agreement and notify GSS (as Administrator) and 
U.S. Bank (as Indenture Trustee) of that action. 
The Trusts thereafter asked U.S. Bank to acknowledge 
Odyssey’s hiring.  Under Section 11.01 of the Indentures, if the 
Issuer (i.e., a trust) requests that the Indenture Trustee (U.S. 
Bank) take any action, the Issuer must provide “the Indenture 
Trustee (i) an Officers’ Certificate of the Issuer stating that all 
conditions precedent . . . relating to the proposed action have 
been complied with and (ii) an Opinion of Counsel stating” as 
much.  J.A. 380.  On January 14, 2016, per the requirements of 
Section 11.01, Wilmington Trust sent an Officers’ Certificate 
of Issuer and an opinion letter to U.S. Bank.  It, however, 
refused to acknowledge Odyssey’s retention. 
D. The Odyssey Agreement  
Under the Odyssey Agreement, Odyssey is to service 
“Defaulted Loans” and “Loans Eligible For Sale.”  OA at 1, 
§ 2(B), J.A. 491.  Odyssey has the authority to purchase certain 
defaulted Loans from the Trusts. 
 
2.  They posit that, “[a]s Special Servicer, U.S. Bank receives 
a fee based on the total outstanding Loan balances . . . [.]  To 
the extent hiring Odyssey will result in Loans being sold, this 
will reduce the fees to which U.S. Bank would otherwise be 
entitled.”  Id. 
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The Noteholders and U.S. Bank, as Indenture Trustee, 
allege that VCG has sought to transfer servicing of newly 
Defaulted Loans from the Special Servicer (U.S. Bank) to 
Odyssey. 
One of the main disputes before us is whether the 
Odyssey Agreement unilaterally, and thus impermissibly, 
amended the Basic Documents.  The parties disagree as to what 
extent the Odyssey Agreement and the Special Servicing 
Agreement are incompatible.   
For example, Appellants (U.S. Bank and the 
Noteholders) argue that the Special Servicing Agreement does 
not permit sales of loans.  The Odyssey Agreement authorizes 
Odyssey to purchase Defaulted Loans at a “purchase price” 
that is 10% less than fair market value of the Defaulted Loan 
(put differently, to retain a 10% commission for arranging for 
the sale of the Loan).  OA § 2(C), J.A. 492–93.  Appellees (the 
Trusts) point to several sections of the Indentures to argue the 
Basic Documents, including the Special Servicing Agreement, 
do allow the sale of loans.  Section 3.14 permits the Indenture 
Trustee to dispose of Loans to three parties: a guarantor, a 
seller, and a servicer.  Indenture § 3.14, J.A. 340.  Loans sold 
to the Servicer must be at a “price [] equal to or in excess of 
the amount required by the applicable . . . Servicing Agreement 
. . . .”  Indenture § 3.14(b), J.A. 340.  The Special Servicing and 
Odyssey Agreements also arguably vary in several other 
respects:  
 The Special Servicing Agreement allows the 
Indenture Trustee to remove the Special Servicer 
for cause without the consent of the Trusts.  SSA 
§ 6(D), J.A. 432–33.  The Odyssey Agreement 
allows for the removal of Odyssey for cause only 
“with the prior written consent of the Trust.”  OA 




 Amendments to the Special Servicing 
Agreement require the consent of the 
Administrator.  SSA § 16, J.A. 442.  The 
Odyssey Agreement requires the Trusts to 
consent to any amendments to the Odyssey 
Agreement.  OA § 15, J.A. 497.  
 The Special Servicing Agreement provides that 
the Indenture Trustee and other transaction 
parties shall be indemnified by the Special 
Servicer for liability arising from “willful 
misconduct, negligence or bad faith,” SSA, § 10, 
J.A 441, whereas the Odyssey Agreement 
provides indemnification for only “willful 
misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith,” OA 
§ 9, J.A. 496 (emphasis added).  
 The Basic Documents did not permit dealings 
with affiliates.  TA § 2.03(b)(iv), J.A. 268.  The 
Odyssey Agreement permits Odyssey to “enter 
into transactions or otherwise deal with any of its 
affiliates.”  OA § 5(B), J.A. 494. 
E. The Unpaid Invoices 
In December 2015, the Trusts submitted more than 
$1.24 million in invoices from Odyssey for payment from the 
Indenture Trust Estate.  Odyssey performed services such as 
conducting audits and other work to evaluate which Defaulted 
Loans could be sold.  GSS, as Administrator, refused to process 
the invoices and requested additional information.  It sent the 
invoices to U.S. Bank as Indenture Trustee, complaining that 
no documentation was provided for the alleged expenses.   
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 F. Procedural History  
In February 2016, U.S. Bank sought instruction from a 
Minnesota state court on (1) whether Odyssey was properly 
appointed as a servicer, (2) whether the Odyssey Agreement is 
invalid because it would amend or modify the Basic 
Documents, and (3) whether the invoices submitted by 
Odyssey for services should be paid.   
The Trusts removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota.  Thereafter, the 
parties stipulated to transferring the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware.  After discovery, 
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.   
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the District 
Court grant the Trusts’ motion for summary judgment, deny 
U.S. Bank’s motion, and order that the Odyssey invoices be 
paid.  The Magistrate Judge found that: (1) under Section 2.03 
of the Indentures, the Trusts have the power “to enter into such 
agreements that are necessary, suitable or convenient” to 
administer the Trusts and service the loans, and that no other 
relevant agreement establishes “an exclusive arrangement 
pursuant to which the Trusts forfeited their right . . . to enter 
into other servicing agreements,” J.A. 38; (2) the Odyssey 
Agreement does not waive, amend, or terminate the terms of 
the Basic Documents because, inter alia, Section 3.14 of the 
Indentures specifically allows for the sale of loans to a servicer 
and there is no conflict between the Odyssey Agreement and 
the Special Servicing Agreement; and (3) the Trusts satisfied 
the applicable Indenture Rating Agency Condition.  The 
Magistrate found that VCG and Odyssey’s alleged self-dealing 
were not dispositive of the issues.   
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U.S. Bank and the Noteholders filed objections to the 
R&R.  The Trusts contend that most of their objections raised 
new arguments not presented before the Magistrate Judge, 
including that the Granting Clause precluded the Trusts from 
hiring Odyssey.   
The District Court essentially adopted the R&R in its 
entirety and held that arguments not presented to the 
Magistrate Judge were waived.  U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 2018 
WL 4462369.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1348, 1441(b), and 1446.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
“The standard of review in an appeal from an order 
resolving cross-motions for summary judgment is plenary.”  
Cantor v. Perelman, 414 F.3d 430, 435 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
“Under our case law, contract interpretation is a 
question of fact reviewed for clear error and contract 
construction is a question of law reviewed de novo.”  Wayne 
Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 894 
F.3d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 2018).  Contract interpretation involves 
determining the meaning of the contract language and giving 
effect to the parties’ intent.  See John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. 
Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 659 (3d. Cir. 1986).  
Construction of a contract goes beyond interpretation and 
requires determining the legal effect and consequences of 
contractual provisions.  Id. (citing 3 Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 534 at 9 (1960)); see also Garden State Tanning 
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Inc. v. Mitchell Mfg. Grp., Inc., 273 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“When an ambiguity exists in the agreement, the 
problem is one of interpretation.  If, however, the terms are 
clear, construction of the contract determines its legal 
operation.”).  
“This case raises an issue of contract construction 
because the issue[s] on appeal do[] not require interpretation of 
any particular terms, but instead ask[] us to determine the legal 
effect of and interplay between various provisions” of the 
Basic Documents and the Odyssey Agreement.  Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 682 F. App’x 921, 926 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Ram Constr. Co. v. Am. States Ins. 
Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052–53 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that a case 
raised issues of contract construction because the court had to 
assess how actions of the parties affected the initial agreement 
and whether a subsequent agreement was created).  We thus 
apply a de novo standard of review. 
Because the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s R&R in all material respects, we review the Magistrate 
Judge’s proposed disposition of the case and treat it and the 
District Judge’s order interchangeably.  See Shaver v. Siemens 
Corp., 670 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Odyssey Agreement Violates the 
Granting Clause. 
Appellants argue that the Indentures’ Granting Clause 
precluded the Trusts from appointing Odyssey as a new 
Servicer because its plain language assigned to the Indenture 
Trustee (U.S. Bank), for the benefit of the Noteholders, any 
right the Trusts may have previously had to appoint servicers.  
The Trusts counter that Appellants waived this argument 
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because they failed to raise it before the Magistrate Judge.  
Alternatively, they argue that the Trusts had the authority to 
appoint Odyssey under the plain language of the Basic 
Documents and they complied with all the requirements of the 
Basic Documents in entering the Odyssey Agreement.   
We agree with the Appellants that the Odyssey 
Agreement violates the Granting Clause.  However, we reach 
this conclusion not because the plain language of the Granting 
Clause prohibits the Trusts from appointing a new servicer, but 
rather because the Odyssey Agreement specifically assigned to 
the Owners of the Trusts several rights reserved for the 
Indenture Trustee, for the benefit of the Noteholders, in the 
Basic Documents.   
1. The Granting Clause Argument was 
not Waived. 
We first address whether Appellants waived their 
argument that the Granting Clause precludes the Trusts from 
entering into the Odyssey Agreement.4  Arguments not 
presented to a magistrate judge and raised for the first time in 
objections to the magistrate’s recommendations are deemed 
 
4 We note that forfeiture “is the failure to make the 
timely assertion of a right,” or the “inadvertent failure to raise 
an argument,” while waiver, in contrast, is the “intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”  Barna v. 
Bd. of Sch. Directors of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 
136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Although “forfeiture” of arguments may be the 
applicable concept to describe Appellants’ alleged failure to 
raise certain arguments here, we use “waiver” because the 
parties and District Court did and the Appellants’ relevant 
arguments are not forfeited in any event.   
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waived.  See Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the 
magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.”).  A 
“passing reference to an issue” does not suffice to preserve it.  
See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Foster Wheeler Energy 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).    
First, the Trusts misrepresent that the District Court held 
that the Granting Clause argument was waived.  The Court in 
fact addressed this argument expressly by holding that “the 
granting clause does not preclude the trusts from appointing 
new servicers.”  U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 2018 WL 4462369, at 
*5.  It recited the standard for waiver but did not hold that there 
was waiver.  Id. at *4. 
 Second, the Trustees concede that the Noteholders 
argued to the Magistrate Judge “that the Odyssey Agreement 
violates the grant of the Indentures,” yet posit that this was 
insufficient to preserve the issue because the argument was 
merely a “passing reference.”  Appellees’ Br. 32.  This too 
misrepresents the record.  The Noteholders’ submission to the 
Magistrate Judge devoted an entire section to the argument that 
the Odyssey Agreement “repudiates the Issuers’ grant.”  J.A. 
1024–25.  The Judge expressly discussed the Granting Clause.  
And the Noteholders joined U.S. Bank’s submissions on 
summary judgment, which included arguments that the 
Odyssey Agreement violated the Clause.   
 On this record, the Trusts cannot claim the Granting 
Clause argument surprised them.  Cf. Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 607 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that “the 
crucial question regarding waiver” is whether the proceedings 
“put the [d]istrict [c]ourt on notice of the legal argument”).  
Moreover, even if Appellants had not clearly raised the 
argument, we have discretion to consider whether the Odyssey 
Agreement contravenes the Grant of the Indenture (something 
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we would do if needed), which presents a “pure question of 
law” “closely related to arguments that [the parties] did raise” 
and for which “[n]o additional fact-finding is necessary.”  
Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005).  With no 
waiver, we thus proceed with Appellants’ arguments.  
2. The Plain Language of the Grant of the 
Indenture Does Not Prohibit the Trusts 
from Appointing a New Servicer.   
The Grant of the Indenture transferred to the Indenture 
Trustee (U.S. Bank), among other rights, “all the Issuer’s right, 
title and interest in and to . . . the Student Loans, . . . [and] all 
Servicing Agreements . . . [,] including the right of the Issuer 
to cause . . . the Servicer to purchase[] Student Loans from the 
Issuer.”  Indenture at 1–2, J.A. 317–18.  To restate, this was 
absolute.   
Appellants contend that the right to appoint servicers is 
not shared; it was one of the rights absolutely granted to the 
Indenture Trustee, and under New York law an assignment of 
this breadth makes the trustee the exclusive holder of the rights 
assigned.  See Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 
No. 14-cv-10116, 2015 WL 2359358, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 
2015) (stating that the grant of “all . . . right, title and interest” 
in the certificates and related claims constituted a “full 
assignment” that “divests plaintiffs of any rights they 
otherwise may have had to commence litigation on their own 
behalf” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); House 
of Eur. Funding I Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 13-cv-
519, 2015 WL 1472301, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) 
(holding that granting clause effected “complete” assignment 
to trustee and rejecting contention that the clause was merely 
an “assignment as security” that reserved to the issuer any right 
to sue) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
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The Trusts counter, and the District Court agreed, 
however, that “[t]he Granting Clause does not purport to divest 
the Trusts of their power and responsibility to appoint 
servicers.  If that was the intention of the Granting Clause, it 
could have easily said so, but it did not.”  Appellees’ Br. 34.  
The Court relied on San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund 
v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 981 
A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (applying New York law), which held 
that “[i]ndentures are to be read strictly[,] and to the extent they 
do not expressly restrict the rights of the issuer, the issuer is 
left with the freedom to act[.]”  Id. at 314.  Thus the Court 
concluded that “[t]here is no language presented to the court 
that takes away this right to appoint servicers.”  U.S. Nat’l Bank 
Ass’n, 2018 WL 4462369, at *5.  It further pointed out that 
“[t]he granting rights clause does not use the language ‘sole’ 
or ‘exclusive holder’ when talking about the Indenture Trustee.  
Yet, when intended, the Indenture uses such words.”  Id. (citing 
Indenture § 6.10(b)(i)).  And indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic [under 
New York law] that the powers of an indenture trustee are 
limited to those specifically articulated in the indentures 
themselves.”  See Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 510, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).    
The other cases Appellants cite to support that under 
New York law the Grant is absolute do not address whether a 
trust retains its right to appoint a servicer pursuant to an 
indenture.  See, e.g., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. U.S. 
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 898 F.3d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 2018) (stating 
that the granting clause effected a “complete transfer” of the 
estate of trusts to an indenture trustee); BlackRock Allocation 
Target Shares: Series S. Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
247 F. Supp. 3d 377, 412–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that 
owners of a trust had no right to control trust assets because the 
owners “contracted it away” to indenture trustee in the granting 
clause).  Instead, they primarily involve residential mortgage-
backed security (“RMBS”) trusts, entities entirely distinct from 
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the Trusts at issue here.  See, e.g., Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1, 
Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 16-cv-1597, 2018 WL 
1417850 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018) (involving RMBS trusts, not 
owner-directed Trusts, and addressing the plaintiff’s right to 
sue, not whether it had the authority to appoint a new servicer); 
Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 
LLC, 762 F.App’x 601, 605 (11th Cir. 2019) (same); Nat’l 
Credit Union Admin. Bd., 898 F.3d at 253–54 (same); 
BlackRock Allocation Target Shares, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 411-
12 (same); Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 
14-cv-10116, 2016 WL 1169515, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 
2016) (same).   
More instructive here is the outcome in Hildene Cap. 
Mgmt., LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 105 A.D.3d 436 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2013).  There the Court held that a granting clause 
similar to the one here did not deprive the issuers of notes of 
their right to enforce provisions of the indentures or other 
agreements.  Plaintiffs, who were senior noteholders, alleged 
that Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”), as trustee, had 
improperly sold collateral securities.  Id. at 437.  Preferred 
Term Securities XX, Ltd. (“PreTSL XX”), as the issuer of the 
notes, moved to intervene, and the Court found it had standing 
to do so based on the contractual duties it assumed under the 
relevant indenture.  Id.  Specifically, in the granting clause, 
PreTSL XX granted its “right, title and interest” in the 
collateral securities to BNYM “for the benefit of itself and the 
Holders of the Notes” and “in trust . . . to secure compliance 
with the provisions of this Indenture . . . .”  Id. at 438.  
However, Section 3.5 of the indenture authorized PreTSL XX 
to take action “necessary or advisable to: . . . preserve and 
defend title to the Collateral.”  Id.  The Court held that it could 
not read the granting clause to divest PreTSL XX of the right 
to bring claims, for the benefit of itself and the noteholders, to 
recover damages for BNYM’s alleged breach.  Id. 
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The Trusts argue that, here too, they assumed certain 
contractual obligations under the Basic Documents that were 
not annulled by the Granting Clause.  They assert they retain 
the obligation to take various actions to protect their interests 
and enforce the obligations of persons doing business with 
them.  This includes the obligation “to enter into such 
agreements that are necessary” to “provide for . . . the servicing 
of the Student Loans.”  TA § 2.03(a)(ii) & (iii), J.A. 268.  In 
addition, Section 3.07(d) of the Indentures provides:  
If the Issuer shall have knowledge of the 
occurrence of a Servicer Default . . . . , the Issuer 
shall promptly notify the Indenture Trustee and 
the Rating Agencies thereof, and shall specify in 
such notice the action, if any, the Issuer is taking 
with respect to such default . . . . [T]he Issuer 
shall take all reasonable steps available to it to 
enforce its rights under the Basic Documents in 
respect of such failure.   
J.A. 336.  And indeed the definition of “Grant” in the 
Indentures states that it is a conveyance of the “rights, powers 
and options . . . of the Granting party,” J.A. 406, and it states 
as well that “none of the obligations” of the granting party are 
transferred thereunder, id.   
As in Hildene Capital Management, 105 A.D.3d 436, 
reading the Granting Clause here to prevent the Trusts from 
hiring a new Servicer would render meaningless Sections 
2.03(a)(ii) and (iii) of the Trust Agreements, and other rights 
and powers of the Trusts, including, inter alia, their right and 
power to hire, designate, and appoint the Special Servicer 
under each Trust’s respective Indenture, Indenture 
§ 2.03(a)(ii)–(iii), to direct audits on behalf of the Trusts, id. 
§ 4.03(d), and to protect the Trusts and take action if they 
become aware of a servicer default, id. § 3.07(d). 
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It is a “cardinal rule of construction that a court should 
not ‘adopt an interpretation’ which will operate to leave a 
‘provision of a contract . . . without force and effect.’”  Corhill 
Corp. v. S.D. Plants, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 595, 599 (N.Y. 1961) 
(citations omitted).  And where one interpretation of a contract 
provision would place it in conflict with another provision, 
courts are obliged to reconcile the provisions to give both 
effect.  Perlbinder v. Board of Mgrs. of 411 E. 53rd St. Condo., 
65 A.D.3d 985, 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).  Holding that the 
Granting Clause prevents the Trusts from ever appointing a 
new servicer would render ineffective several provisions of the 
Basic Documents.  Thus we decline to adopt such an 
interpretation.   
Because the Granting Clause does not state that it 
divests the Trusts of their power and obligation to appoint 
servicers and because interpreting the Clause to do so would 
render several other provisions of the Basic Documents not 
effective, we hold that the Granting Clause does not 
categorically prohibit the Trusts from appointing another 
servicer.   
This conclusion does not end our analysis, however.  
That the Trusts still have authority to appoint a new servicer 
does not mean that the Odyssey Agreement specifically does 
not violate the Granting Clause.5   
 
5 The Trusts also argue that Section 2 of the Special 
Servicing Agreement gives them the power to appoint the 
Special Servicer under each of the Trust’s respective 
Indentures.  They point out that U.S. Bank itself became the 
Special Servicer after signing the Special Servicing Agreement 
in March 2009 (years after the Indentures were executed), and 
that the Trusts previously entered into servicing agreements 
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3. The Odyssey Agreement Violates the 
Granting Clause by Reserving for the 
Trusts Rights Belonging to the 
Indenture Trustee for the Benefit of the 
Noteholders.   
Appellants also countered that the Odyssey Agreement 
impermissibly reserved for the Trusts several rights that the 
Granting Clause conveyed to the Indenture Trustee, including, 
among others, the right to replace Odyssey for cause (Section 
6(C)), and the right to direct Odyssey to act free from liability 
to the Indenture Trustee (Section 9).  J.A. 492, 494, 496.  
 We agree.  Under the Special Servicing Agreement, the 
Indenture Trustee “shall” remove the Successor Special 
 
with different entities, such as the Master Servicing Agreement 
between the PA Education Agency and the First Marblehead 
Corporation in 2006.  According to the Trusts, just as they 
could enter the Special Servicing Agreement and the Master 
Servicing Agreement, they could enter the Odyssey 
Agreement.  This argument fails, however, because, with 
respect to the Special Servicing Agreement, U.S. Bank is not 
acting only as the Special Servicer; it also serves as the 
Indenture Trustee and its complaint about the Odyssey 
Agreement is that its rights as Trustee are being violated.  And 
that the terms of the Master Servicing Agreement and any other 
servicing agreement may not have violated the Basic 
Documents does not shield the Odyssey Agreement from 
criticism.  Appellants do not argue that those other agreements 
usurped the rights of the Indenture Trustee or included the kind 
of provisions the Odyssey Agreement includes.  Those 
agreements are substantively different from the Odyssey 
Agreement and not pertinent in our case.  
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Servicer upon the occurrence of certain specified defaults.  
SSA § 6.D, J.A. 432–33.  Odyssey, in contrast, cannot be 
removed for defaults under the Odyssey Agreement without 
consent of the Trusts.  OA § 6(C), J.A. 494.6  Likewise, under 
the Special Servicing Agreement the Indenture Trustee had a 
right to indemnity by the Special Servicer for liability traced to 
“willful misconduct, negligence or bad faith,” SSA § 10, J.A. 
 
6 The Trusts claim that Section 6(C) cannot violate the 
Granting Clause because the Master Servicing Agreement gave 
First Marblehead Corporation the right to terminate the Master 
Servicing Agreement.  However, Appellants correctly point 
out that Section 6(C) is readily distinguishable from the rights 
granted to First Marblehead Corporation under the Master 
Servicing Agreement.  It expressly contemplated that First 
Marblehead Corporation’s rights under that Agreement would 
be assigned to “Permitted Assignees” — i.e., the Indenture 
Trustee, among others — as part of the original securitization 
process.  Master Servicing Agreement (“MSA”) § 1.32, J.A. 
742 (defining “Permitted Assignees” to include the Indenture 
Trustee); MSA §13.02(b), J.A. 771 (contemplating that rights 
of First Marblehead Corporation will be “assigned to Permitted 
Assignees”); MSA § 13.03, J.A. 771–72 (“all rights and 
obligations of [First Marblehead Corporation] under this 
Agreement with respect to [] Student Loans shall inure to . . . 
the Permitted Assignees”).  Whatever termination rights First 
Marblehead Corporation had under the Master Servicing 
Agreement were ultimately granted to the Indenture Trustee.  
Moreover, the Master Servicing Agreement specifically states 
that “[n]othing contained herein shall be construed to create an 
exclusive arrangement . . . . The Servicer understands and 
agrees that [First Marblehead Corporation] may enter into 
other agreements for the servicing of Private Student Loans in 
the future.”  MSA § 15.03, J.A. 776.   
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441, whereas the Odyssey Agreement provides 
indemnification for only “willful misconduct, gross negligence 
or bad faith,” OA § 9, J.A. 496 (emphasis added).  
We discuss in the next section how the Odyssey 
Agreement impermissibly modified and supplemented the 
Basic Documents.  Some of those modifications were the same 
reassignment of rights from the Indenture Trustee to the Trusts 
discussed here.  Whether we treat the relevant provisions of the 
Odyssey Agreement as impermissible reassignments of rights 
or unilateral modifications, they render the Odyssey 
Agreement invalid.   
B. The Odyssey Agreement Impermissibly 
Modified and Supplemented the Basic 
Documents Without Consent.  
Although we hold that the Granting Clause does not 
divest the Trusts of their authority to appoint new servicers, we 
still must address Appellants’ argument that the Indentures 
unambiguously require consent from the Indenture Trustee and 
the Noteholders for any amendment, supplement, or 
termination of the terms of the Basic Documents, and whether 
the Odyssey Agreement modified and supplemented the Basic 
Documents without that consent.7   
 
7 Our reading of the Granting Clause avoids the 
untenable outcome that the Trusts can never replace the 
servicer no matter how ineffectual it may be in performing its 
role (the accusation they direct at U.S. Bank).  Holding that the 
Odyssey Agreement specifically violated the Granting Clause 
does not render the Trusts helpless.  It allows them to appoint 
a new servicer.  They just cannot do so in a way that violates 
the Basic Documents.  For example, the Trusts conceivably 
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The parties do not contest that the Trusts did not obtain 
consent from the Indenture Trustee or the Noteholders before 
entering the Odyssey Agreement.  The question thus devolves 
to whether that agreement impermissibly effected any 
modifications or supplements to the Basic Documents.   
1. We Assess the Effect of the Odyssey 
Agreement on the Basic Documents to 
Determine Whether it Violated the 
Consent Clause of the Indentures.   
Section 3.07(c) of the Indentures prohibits any 
alteration to the Special Servicing Agreement or other Basic 
Documents — specifically, any change that would “waive, 
amend, modify, supplement or terminate” them — “without 
the consent of the Indenture Trustee and the Interested 
Noteholders . . . .”  Indenture § 3.07(c), (f), J.A. 336.  The 
Special Servicing Agreement also prohibits any amendment 
without the consent of “the parties [thereto]” and “the 
Administrator;” any amendment must also satisfy the Rating 
Agency Condition; and any successor servicer must be 
approved by the Indenture Trustee and be affirmatively 
approved by the Rating Agencies.  SSA §§ 6(E), 16, 22(A), 
J.A. 433, 442, 444.  
We address first whether only formal alterations of the 
Basic Documents violate Section 3.07(c).  The Trusts argue in 
essence, and the District Court agreed, that any agreement 
short of a formal modification cannot trigger the Consent 
Clause because Section 3.07(f) states that approval is required 
for anything that “amend[s], modif[ies], waive[s], 
supplement[s], terminate[s] or surrender[s] . . . the terms of . . . 
the Basic Documents,” J.A. 336–37 (emphasis added), and the 
 
could have entered another agreement that did not retain solely 
for the Trusts the right to hire and fire the servicer.  
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Odyssey Agreement did not make any actual modifications or 
additions to those terms.  Applying a strict construction, the 
Court held that the Odyssey Agreement does not alter the terms 
of the Special Servicing Agreement or other Basic Documents.  
U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 2018 WL 4462369, at *5.8 
We disagree and hold that the District Court’s 
conclusion contravenes well-settled New York law.  Under that 
law, parties to contracts cannot do anything that “‘will have the 
effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to 
receive the fruits of the contract.”  Empresas Cablevision, 
S.A.B. de C.V. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 680 F. Supp. 2d 
625, 631 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 
663 N.E.2d 289 (N.Y. 1995)), aff’d and remanded, 381 F. 
App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  Courts look to the 
effect of a contractual action.  In Empresas, for example, 
Cablevisión sought to enjoin its lender, JPMorgan, from selling 
a 90% “participation” in the loan (an action that did not require 
Cablevisión’s consent under the credit agreement), arguing 
that the participation was in fact an “assignment” under the 
agreement (an action that did explicitly require Cablevisión’s 
consent).  680 F. Supp. 2d at 626.  The Court held that 
JPMorgan could not under the guise of selling a “participation” 
 
8 Appellees assert that Appellants waived several of 
their arguments as to how the Odyssey Agreement alters 
provisions in the Basic Documents.  However, the Magistrate 
Judge specifically considered the modification argument, J.A. 
47–49, even if not quite in the form presented before us.  These 
arguments are thus not waived.  See United States v. Joseph, 
730 F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that while parties 
may not raise new arguments, they may place “greater 
emphasis and more fully explain an argument on appeal”).  
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accomplish what was in substance a forbidden assignment.  Id. 
at 631–32.  
Here too the Trusts cannot circumvent Section 3.07(c) 
by entering a “new” agreement for the servicing of Defaulted 
Loans that achieves the same result as an amendment without 
obtaining the required consents.  See Penny Lane Owners 
Corp. v. Conthur Dev. Co., No. 94-cv-940, 2000 WL 178189, 
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (refusing to “exalt form over 
function” by treating a “lease” as an “assignment,” “even if 
[the agreement] is not labeled so”); In re LightSquared Inc., 
511 B.R. 253, 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that party 
to credit agreement could not “end-run . . . the Eligible 
Assignee provisions of the Credit Agreement” by engaging in 
prohibited conduct through a shell company).  Cf. President & 
Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Glancy, No. 18790, 2003 WL 
21026784, at *14, 20 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2003) (rejecting 
shareholder agreement that effectively amended a preexisting 
voting trust agreement without the required unanimous 
shareholder approval).  Indeed, the Trusts concede that the 
purpose of the Odyssey Agreement was to remedy and replace 
the existing special servicing arrangement because of U.S. 
Bank’s alleged poor collection practices.   
Thus we assess whether the Odyssey Agreement had the 
effect of altering the Basic Documents even if there was no 
formal amendment.  If the Odyssey Agreement is indeed an 
attempt to end-run the Consent Clause and modifies or 
supplements the Basic Documents without the consent of the 
Indenture Trustee and Noteholders, then it is invalid.  We 
review each alleged modification or supplement in turn. 
2. Purchasing Loans from the Trust at 
Below-Market Value  
Appellants assert that the Odyssey Agreement amends 
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the Basic Documents by giving a new power to Odyssey to 
purchase certain Defaulted Loans from the Trusts at below-
market value and to control the purchase price and the sale 
process of loans pledged to the Indenture Trustee.  The 
Odyssey Agreement authorizes Odyssey to purchase Defaulted 
Loans at a “purchase price” that is 10% less than fair market 
value of the Defaulted Loan, in other words, to retain a 10% 
commission for arranging for the sale of the Loan.  OA § 2(C), 
J.A. 492–93.   
The Trusts counter that Odyssey may only purchase 
Defaulted Loans from them in accord with mechanisms 
provided in the Basic Documents.  They point to several 
sections of the Indentures to suggest the Basic Documents, 
including the Special Servicing Agreement, do allow the sale 
of loans.  For example, Section 3.14 allows the Indenture 
Trustee to dispose of loans to three parties: a guarantor, a seller, 
and a servicer, J.A. 340, and loans sold to the Servicer must be 
at a “price equal to or in excess of the amount required by the 
applicable . . . Servicing Agreement,” Indenture § 3.14(b), J.A. 
340.   
Contrast this with the Odyssey Agreement.  For 
Odyssey to purchase Defaulted Loans from the Trusts, the 
latter must provide an Issuer Order to the Indenture Trustee 
directing the sale of the Loans to Odyssey, and that Order must 
state the purchase price.  OA § 2.C, J.A. 492–93; Indenture, 
§ 3.14, J.A. 340.  The Indenture Trustee must acknowledge and 
sign the Order for the Loans to be sold to Odyssey.  Id.  This 
same mechanism is specifically provided in the Basic 
Documents.  Moreover, the Trusts allege the Odyssey 
Agreement does not allow Defaulted Loans to be sold at 
below-market value and the Trusts cannot unilaterally set a 
purchase price, as the Indenture requires that the purchase price 
be equal to or in excess of the market value as determined in 
the Odyssey Agreement.  However, that market value is 
33 
 
determined according to the methods provided in the Odyssey 
Agreement.  It provides for two methods for calculating the 
market value, specifically: (i) the highest bid received from at 
least three qualified bidders when conducting the sale in a 
manner that will yield the “highest and best net proceeds to be 
paid” in exchange for the Loans; or (ii) the average value 
determined from the appraisal values of two reputable 
appraisers.  OA § 2(C)(iii), J.A. 493.  
Market value is thus ultimately determined by methods 
laid out in the Odyssey Agreement.  They do not appear in the 
Basic Documents.  Accordingly, the Odyssey Agreement 
supplemented the Basic Documents at least with respect to the 
methods for calculating market value of the Defaulted Loans 
Odyssey may purchase.  This supplement was made without 
the consent of the Indenture Trustee or Noteholders, and thus 
it violates the Consent Clause.   
We could end our analysis here, but we briefly consider 
several additional provisions of the Odyssey Agreement that 
modified the terms of the Basic Documents.9   
 
9 Appellants also argue that the PA Education Agency 
Servicing Agreement and the Special Servicing Agreement 
created an exclusive servicing arrangement for Defaulted 
Loans, which are now handled by U.S. Bank in its role as 
Successor Special Servicer, J.A. 958, and that the Odyssey 
Agreement modifies and violates this exclusive servicing 
arrangement by providing for Odyssey to service Defaulted 
Loans.  This argument fails for the reasons discussed above in 
Section III.A.3.  
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3. Indemnity Protection  
The Odyssey Agreement also modifies indemnity 
protections related to servicing.  The Special Servicing 
Agreement provides that the Indenture Trustee and other 
parties shall be indemnified by the special servicer for liability 
arising from “willful misconduct, negligence or bad faith,” 
SSA § 10, J.A. 441, whereas the Odyssey Agreement provides 
indemnification for only “willful misconduct, gross negligence 
or bad faith,” O.A. § 9, J.A. 496 (emphasis added). 
The District Court held that there is “no provision in the 
Indentures or in the [Special Servicing Agreement] [that] 
[provides] that every servicing agreement must mirror the 
others, ,” U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 2018 WL 4462369, at *5, and 
the Trusts add that the existence of differing terms in the 
Odyssey Agreement and the Special Servicing Agreement does 
not mean the former modified the latter.   
However, the question is not whether all servicing 
agreements must be identical.  Appellants have rights outlined 
in the Basic Documents as Indenture Trustee and Noteholders.  
U.S. Bank as Indenture Trustee (not as servicer) has less 
indemnity protection under the terms of the Odyssey 
Agreement than under the terms of the Special Servicing 
Agreement.  This result also is a modification of the Special 
Servicing Agreement that was not consented to by the 
Indenture Trustee or the Noteholders.  It thus violates the 
Consent Clause.   
4. Removal of Servicer  
 As discussed in Section III.A.3 above, the Odyssey 
Agreement also modified the process by which a servicer could 
be removed.  Briefly, under the Special Servicing Agreement 
the Indenture Trustee “shall” remove the Successor Special 
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Servicer when certain defaults occur.  SSA, § 6.D, J.A. 432–
33.  Odyssey, in contrast, cannot be removed for defaults under 
the Odyssey Agreement without consent of the Trusts.  OA 
§ 6(C), J.A. 494.  Hence Section 6(C) of the Odyssey 
Agreement also modified the Special Servicing Agreement 
without consent of the required parties.10 
 
10 Appellants tell us that the Odyssey Agreement fails to 
satisfy the Indenture Rating Agency Condition and the Special 
Servicing Agreement Rating Agency Condition, effectively 
writing both provisions out of the Basic Documents and thus 
modifying them.  The Trusts counter that they satisfied the 
Indenture Rating Agency Condition, see Indenture, 
Definitions, J.A. 414, when they provided the Rating Agencies 
with notice of their “intention to hire Odyssey as a Servicer” 
and sent them each a copy of the Odyssey Agreement.  J.A. 
844.  None of the Rating Agencies sent written notice that the 
Agreement would result in a reduction or withdrawal of the 
rating of the Notes.  As for the Special Servicing Agreement 
Rating Agency Condition, see SSA § 6(E), J.A. 433, the Trusts 
allege that it applies only to the “resignation or removal of the 
Special Servicer,” J.A. 433, and that here the Trusts have not 
removed U.S. Bank as Special Servicer nor was Odyssey hired 
as a successor Special Servicer.  The Trusts contend that 
Odyssey was appointed as an additional servicer for Defaulted 
Loans and they informed the Ratings Agencies as much.  J.A. 
873.  But even assuming both Ratings Agency Conditions have 
been met, our conclusion remains unchanged—several 
provisions of the Odyssey Agreement violate the Granting 
Clause and the Consent Clause.   
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  5. Amendments  
Amendments to the Special Servicing Agreement must 
be agreed to by parties other than the Trust, including the 
Special Servicer, Indenture Trustee, and the Administrator.  
SSA § 16, J.A. 442.  The Odyssey Agreement has no such 
provision and reserves for the Trusts the right to amend it.  OA 
§ 15, J.A. 497.  This too is a modification inasmuch as it affects 
the rights of the Indenture Trustee and Noteholders vis-a-vis 
the servicer.11 
C. The District Court Must Determine in the 
First Instance Whether the Odyssey Invoices 
Are Payable.  
Because the District Court held that the Odyssey 
Agreement did not violate the Granting Clause or the Consent 
 
11 Because we hold that the Odyssey Agreement 
violated the Granting Clause and the Consent Clause, we need 
not decide whether the Agreement’s formation was an arm’s-
length transaction or improper self-dealing.  We note, however, 
that the Indentures require the Trusts to “maintain an arm’s 
length relationship with . . . any of the [Trusts’] Affiliates” and 
to preserve the lien of the Indentures.  Indenture § 3.23(l), (o), 
J.A. 346.  The Trust Agreements prohibit the Trusts from 
giving “the appearance [] of conducting business on behalf of 
any Owner or any Affiliate of an Owner.” TA § 2.03(b)(iv), 
J.A. 268.  VCG nonetheless stands on both sides of the 
Odyssey Agreement.  Its chairman signed VCG’s letter (as an 
Owner of the Trusts) directing the Trusts to appoint Odyssey 
as servicer.  He also signed the Odyssey Agreement on behalf 
of Odyssey.  J.A. 500.  It is hard to see how such a transaction 
could be considered as conducted at arm’s length.  See LiquidX 
Inc. v. Brooklawn Capital, LLC, 254 F. Supp. 3d 609, 618 
37 
 
Clause and was thus enforceable, it also ruled that Odyssey is 
entitled to payment for its invoices from the pledged assets of 
the Trusts.  The Court had no opportunity to consider whether 
the invoices would be payable if the Odyssey Agreement were 
invalid and thus void.  It will need to answer this question on 
remand.   
Appellants maintain that, because the appointment of 
Odyssey was invalid, it was never an authorized servicer and 
has no right to any payment.  However, because the District 
Court did not rule on this issue and the parties have not fully 
briefed it before us, we decline to decide in the first instance 
whether Odyssey’s invoices are payable.   
CONCLUSION 
Although the Odyssey Agreement does not violate the 
Granting Clause by appointing another servicer, it does violate 
it by assigning to the Owners of the Trusts several rights 
reserved for the Indenture Trustee, for the benefit of the 
Noteholders, in the Basic Documents.  The Odyssey 
Agreement required the consent of the Indenture Trustee and 
Noteholders because it supplements and amends several 
provisions of the Basic Documents.  Accordingly, the Odyssey 
Agreement is invalid and, if so, the Odyssey Invoices are likely 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that a transaction engineered “from 
both sides” cannot be at “arm’s length”); Roso v. Saxon Energy 
Corp., 758 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (transaction 
where a party held “integral positions on both sides of the 
agreement” could not be “considered at arms-length”).  It is 
true that the decision to hire Odyssey was not VCG’s alone, 
but jointly VCG and Citibank’s call.  However, that other 
parties were involved does not resolve the problem of VCG 
being on both sides of the Agreement.  
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not payable.  We remand to the District Court to decide that 
issue in the first instance with the benefit of further briefing.  
Hence we affirm in part and reverse in part the rulings of the 
District Court.  
